

## Glossary

The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions, and other selected terms. Where Army and joint definitions are different, (*Army*) follows the term. Terms for which FM 3-0 is the proponent manual (the authority) are marked with an asterisk (\*) and followed by the number of the paragraph (§) or page where they are defined. For other terms, refer to the manual listed. JP 1-02 and FM 1-02 are posted in the Joint Electronic Library, which is available online and on CD-ROM.

- Use this URL to access JP 1-02 online: <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/index.html>.
- Use this URL to access FM 1-02 online: [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service\\_pubs/101\\_5\\_1.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/101_5_1.pdf).
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|                                |   |         |
|--------------------------------|---|---------|
| <b>73 Easting</b>              | a location in Iraq where the 2d ACR engaged the Tawakalna Division during the Gulf War                          |         |
| <b>AADC</b>                    | area air defense commander  |         |
| <b>AC</b>                      | active component  |         |
| <b>ACR</b>                     | armored cavalry regiment  |         |
| <b>ACSA</b>                    | acquisition cross-service agreement   |         |
| <b>ADADO</b>                   | assistance division air defense officer   |         |
| <b>ADCON</b>                   | administrative control  |         |
| <b>ADE</b>                     | assistant division engineer   |         |
| <b>administrative control</b>  | .....   | JP 1-02 |
| <b>administrative movement</b> | .....   | JP 1-02 |
| <b>adversary</b>               | a person or group that is opposed to an Army force mission but is not engaging Army forces in combat operations |         |
| <b>*agility</b>                | .....   | ¶4-58   |
| <b>alliance</b>                | .....   | JP 1-02 |
| <b>allocated forces</b>        | .....   | JP 5-0  |
| <b>ALO</b>                     | air liaison officer   |         |
| <b>*ambush</b>                 | .....   | ¶7-64   |

|                                  |                                 |         |
|----------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------|
| <b>AMC</b>                       | US Army Material Command        |         |
| <b>AMEDD</b>                     | US Army Medical Department      |         |
| <b>amphibious objective area</b> | .....                           | JP 1-02 |
| <b>antiterrorism</b>             | .....                           | JP 1-02 |
| <b>AO</b>                        | area of operations              |         |
| <b>AOR</b>                       | area of responsibility          |         |
| <b>apportioned forces</b>        | .....                           | JP 5-0  |
| <b>*approach march</b>           | (Army) .....                    | ¶7-45   |
| <b>AR</b>                        | Army Regulation                 |         |
| <b>area damage control</b>       | .....                           | JP 1-02 |
| <b>*area defense</b>             | .....                           | ¶8-20   |
| <b>area of influence</b>         | .....                           | JP 1-02 |
| <b>area of interest</b>          | .....                           | JP 1-02 |
| <b>area of operations</b>        | .....                           | JP 1-02 |
| <b>area of responsibility</b>    | .....                           | JP 1-02 |
| <b>area security</b>             | .....                           | FM 1-02 |
| <b>*ARFOR</b>                    | .....                           | ¶2-38   |
| <b>ARNG</b>                      | Army National Guard             |         |
| <b>ARSOF</b>                     | Army special operations forces  |         |
| <b>ARVN</b>                      | Army of the Republic of Vietnam |         |
| <b>ASCC</b>                      | Army service component command  |         |
| <b>*assessment</b>               | (Army) .....                    | ¶6-90   |
| <b>assigned forces</b>           | .....                           | JP 5-0  |
| <b>*attack</b>                   | .....                           | ¶7-53   |
| <b>augmentation forces</b>       | .....                           | JP 1-02 |
| <b>avenue of approach</b>        | .....                           | JP 1-02 |
| <b>base</b>                      | (Army) .....                    | FM 1-02 |
| <b>base cluster</b>              | (Army) .....                    | FM 1-02 |
| <b>base of operations</b>        | .....                           | JP 1-02 |
| <b>*battle</b>                   | .....                           | ¶2-12   |
| <b>*battle command</b>           | .....                           | ¶5-3    |
| <b>battle drill</b>              | .....                           | FM 1-02 |
| <b>*battlefield organization</b> | .....                           | ¶4-83   |
| <b>battle handover</b>           | .....                           | FM 1-02 |

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|---|---|---------|
| <b>battle position</b>                          | .....   | FM 1-02 |
| <b>battlespace</b>                              | .....   | JP 1-02 |
| <b>BG</b>                                       | brigadier general   |         |
| <b>block</b>                                    | .....   | FM 1-02 |
| <b>BOS</b>                                      | battlefield operating systems   |         |
| <b>*branch</b>                                  | .....   | ¶6-17   |
| <b>C2</b>                                       | command and control   |         |
| <b>campaign</b>                                 | .....   | JP 1-02 |
| <b>canalize</b>                                 | (Army).....   | FM 1-02 |
| <b>CBRNE</b>                                    | chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive |         |
| <b>CCIR</b>                                     | commander's critical information requirements                         |         |
| <b>CD-ROM</b>                                   | compact disk, read-only memory  |         |
| <b>centers of gravity</b>                       | .....   | JP 1-02 |
| <b>CIMIC</b>                                    | civil-military cooperation (NATO use only)                            |         |
| <b>civil affairs</b>                            | (Army).....   | FM 1-02 |
| <b>CJCS</b>                                     | chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff                                 |         |
| <b>CJCSI</b>                                    | Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction                     |         |
| <b>CJCSM</b>                                    | Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual                          |         |
| <b>classes of supply (I–IX)</b>                 | .....   | FM 1-02 |
| <b>*close area</b>                              | .....   | ¶4-96   |
| <b>*close combat</b>                            | .....   | ¶4-9    |
| <b>CM</b>                                       | consequence management  |         |
| <b>CMO</b>                                      | civil-military operations   |         |
| <b>CMOC</b>                                     | civil-military operations center                                      |         |
| <b>COA</b>                                      | course of action  |         |
| <b>coalition</b>                                | .....   | JP 1-02 |
| <b>COCOM</b>                                    | combatant command (command authority)                                 |         |
| <b>combatant command (command authority)</b>    | .....   | JP 1-02 |
| <b>combat health support</b>                    | .....   | FM 1-02 |
| <b>combat power</b>                             | .....   | JP 1-02 |
| <b>combat service support</b>                   | (Army).....   | FM 1-02 |
| <b>*combat service support reach operations</b> | .....   | ¶12-4   |
| <b>combatting terrorism</b>                     | .....   | JP 1-02 |

|   |                                |         |
|---|--------------------------------|---------|
| <b>combat zone</b>                                    | .....                          | JP 1-02 |
| <b>*combined arms</b>                                 | .....                          | ¶4-102  |
| <b>command</b>  | .....                          | JP 1-02 |
| <b>command and control</b>                            | .....                          | JP 1-02 |
| <b>*commander’s critical information requirements</b> | .....                          | ¶11-39  |
| <b>*commander’s intent</b>                            | .....                          | ¶5-61   |
| <b>*common operational picture</b>                    | .....                          | ¶11-43  |
| <b>communications zone</b>                            | .....                          | JP 1-02 |
| <b>COMMZ</b>  | communications zone            |         |
| <b>component</b>                                      | .....                          | JP 1-02 |
| <b>*concept of operations</b>                         | .....                          | ¶6-19   |
| <b>contingency plan</b>                               | (Army) .....                   | FM 1-02 |
| <b>control measure</b>                                | .....                          | FM 1-02 |
| <b>CONUS</b>  | continental United States      |         |
| <b>coordinating authority</b>                         | .....                          | JP 1-02 |
| <b>COP</b>  | common operational picture     |         |
| <b>counterair</b>                                     | .....                          | JP 1-02 |
| <b>*counterattack</b>                                 | (Army) .....                   | ¶7-61   |
| <b>counterdrug operations</b>                         | .....                          | JP 1-02 |
| <b>counterfire</b>                                    | .....                          | JP 1-02 |
| <b>counterguerrilla operations</b>                    | .....                          | JP 1-02 |
| <b>counterinsurgency</b>                              | .....                          | JP 1-02 |
| <b>countermobility operations</b>                     | .....                          | FM 1-02 |
| <b>counterterrorism</b>                               | .....                          | JP 1-02 |
| <b>coup de main</b>                                   | .....                          | JP 1-02 |
| <b>course of action</b>                               | (Army) .....                   | FM 1-02 |
| <b>cover</b>  | (Army) .....                   | FM 1-02 |
| <b>CS</b>   | combat support                 |         |
| <b>CSG</b>  | corps support group (graphics) |         |
| <b>CSM</b>  | command sergeant major         |         |
| <b>CSS</b>  | combat service support         |         |
| <b>CUL</b>  | common user logistic/logistics |         |
| <b>*culminating point</b>                             | .....                          | ¶5-38   |
| <b>DA</b>   | Department of the Army         |         |

|  |   |                              |
|--|---|------------------------------|
| <b>Dayton Accords</b>                        | the agreements that established the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, signed on 21 November 1995, in Dayton, Ohio                        |                              |
| <b>decisive engagement</b>                   | (Army).....   | FM 1-02                      |
| <b>*decisive operation</b>                   | .....   | ¶4-84                        |
| <b>*decisive point</b>                       | .....<br>(This definition is being staffed in draft JP 3-0. If accepted, it will become a joint definition.)  | ¶5-30                        |
| <b>decisive terrain</b>                      | .....   | FM 1-02                      |
| <b>*deep area</b>                            | .....   | ¶4-98                        |
| <b>defeat in detail</b>                      | Defeat in detail is achieved by concentrating overwhelming combat power against separate parts of a force rather than defeating the entire force at once (see FM 3-90). |                              |
| <b>*defensive operations</b>                 | .....   | ¶1-48                        |
| <b>*defensive information operations</b>     | (Army) .....  | page 11-17                   |
| <b>delay</b>                                 | .....   | JP 1-02, see delaying action |
| <b>*demonstration</b>                        | (Army).....   | ¶7-66                        |
| <b>deployment</b>                            | .....   | JP 1-02                      |
| <b>*depth</b>                                | .....   | ¶4-61                        |
| <b>destroy</b>                               | .....   | FM 1-02                      |
| <b>deterrence</b>                            | .....   | JP 1-02                      |
| <b>direct action</b>                         | .....   | JP 1-02                      |
| <b>*direct approach</b>                      | .....   | ¶5-42                        |
| <b>disease and nonbattle injury casualty</b> | .....   | JP 1-02                      |
| <b>disrupt</b>                               | .....   | FM 1-02                      |
| <b>DLA</b>                                   | Defense Logistics Agency  |                              |
| <b>DNBI</b>                                  | disease and nonbattle injury  |                              |
| <b>DOD</b>                                   | Department of Defense   |                              |
| <b>DODD</b>                                  | Department of Defense Directive   |                              |
| <b>domestic support operations</b>           | .....   | JP 1-02                      |
| <b>DS</b>                                    | direct support  |                              |
| <b>DSO</b>                                   | domestic support operations   |                              |
| <b>DTLOMS</b>                                | doctrine, training, leader development, organizations, materiel, and soldiers   |                              |
| <b>DTRACS</b>                                | Defense Transportation Reporting and Control System   |                              |
| <b>EA</b>                                    | engagement area (graphics)  |                              |

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|--|---|---------|
| EEFI                                       | essential elements of friendly information  |         |
| electromagnetic pulse                      | (Army) .....  | FM 1-02 |
| employment                                 | .....   | JP 1-02 |
| *encirclement                              | .....   | ¶7-34   |
| *end state                                 | (Army) .....  | ¶5-25   |
| enemy                                      | an individual or group engaging Army forces in combat   |         |
| *engagement                                | .....   | ¶2-12   |
| engagement area                            | .....   | FM 1-02 |
| *envelopment                               | (Army) .....  | ¶7-31   |
| eny  | enemy (graphics)  |         |
| essential elements of friendly information | .....   | FM 1-02 |
| EW   | electronic warfare  |         |
| executive agent                            | .....   | JP 1-02 |
| exploitation                               | .....   | JP 1-02 |
| *exterior lines                            | .....   | ¶5-35   |
| facility                                   | (Army) a structure or location providing a work environment<br>(This definition is being staffed with draft FM 6-0. If approved, it<br>will become an Army definition.) |         |
| FARP                                       | forward arming and refueling point  |         |
| FEBA                                       | forward edge of the battle area   |         |
| *feint                                     | (Army) .....  | ¶7-65   |
| FEMA                                       | Federal Emergency Management Agency   |         |
| FFIR                                       | friendly force information requirements   |         |
| FHA  | foreign humanitarian assistance   |         |
| FID  | foreign internal defense  |         |
| firepower                                  | .....   | JP 1-02 |
| fires                                      | .....   | JP 1-02 |
| fire support                               | .....   | JP 1-02 |
| fire support coordinating measure          | (Army).....   | FM 1-02 |
| fix  | (Army) .....  | FM 1-02 |
| flexible deterrent option                  | .....   | JP 1-02 |
| FLOT                                       | forward line of own troops  |         |
| FM   | field manual  |         |
| force projection                           | .....   | JP 1-02 |

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|--|---|
| <b>*force protection</b>                       | (Army)..... ¶4-22<br>(This definition is being staffed in draft JP 3-0. If accepted, it will become a joint definition.)                  |
| <b>forces for</b>                              | the “Forces for Unified Commands” memorandum, by which the secretary of defense assigns service forces to combatant commands (see JP 0-2) |
| <b>*force tailoring</b>                        | ..... ¶3-27   |
| <b>force tracking</b>                          | ..... JP 1-02   |
| <b>*forcible entry</b>                         | ..... ¶3-51<br>(This definition is being staffed in draft JP 3-18. If accepted, it will become a joint definition.)                       |
| <b>foreign internal defense</b>                | ..... JP 1-02   |
| <b>forward arming and refueling point</b>      | ..... FM 1-02   |
| <b>forward boundary</b>                        | ..... FM 1-02   |
| <b>forward edge of the battle area</b>         | ..... JP 1-02   |
| <b>forward line of own troops</b>              | (Army)..... FM 1-02   |
| <b>fragmentary order</b>                       | (Army)..... FM 1-02   |
| <b>*fratricide</b>                             | ..... ¶4-27   |
| <b>friendly force information requirements</b> | ..... FM 1-02   |
| <b>*frontal attack</b>                         | (Army)..... ¶7-40   |
| <b>FSCL</b>                                    | fire support coordination line  |
| <b>FSCM</b>                                    | fire support coordinating measure   |
| <b>*full spectrum operations</b>               | ..... page 1-4  |
| <b>functional component command</b>            | ..... JP 1-02   |
| <b>G1</b>                                      | assistant chief of staff, personnel   |
| <b>G2</b>                                      | assistant chief of staff, intelligence  |
| <b>G3</b>                                      | assistant chief of staff, operations  |
| <b>G4</b>                                      | assistant chief of staff, logistics   |
| <b>G5</b>                                      | assistant chief of staff, civil affairs   |
| <b>GCCS</b>                                    | global command and control system   |
| <b>GEN</b>                                     | general   |
| <b>GS</b>                                      | general support   |
| <b>GSR</b>                                     | general support reinforcing   |
| <b>hazard</b>                                  | ..... JP 1-02   |
| <b>HCA</b>                                     | humanitarian and civic assistance   |
| <b>high-payoff target</b>                      | ..... FM 1-02   |

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|--|--|--------------------------------------|
| <b>home station</b>                                | .....  | JP 1-02                              |
| <b>hostile environment</b>                         | .....  | JP 1-02, see operational environment |
| <b>humanitarian and civic assistance</b>           | .....  | JP 1-02                              |
| <b>IFOR</b>  | NATO Implementation Force (Bosnia)             |                                      |
| <b>IG</b>  | inspector general                              |                                      |
| <b>IM</b>  | information management                         |                                      |
| <b>indications and warning</b>                     | .....  | JP 1-02                              |
| <b>*indirect approach</b>                          | .....  | ¶5-42                                |
| <b>*infiltration</b>                               | (Army) .....                                   | ¶7-36                                |
| <b>information</b>                                 | .....  | JP 1-02                              |
| <b>information environment</b>                     | .....  | JP 1-02                              |
| <b>*information management</b>                     | .....  | ¶11-28                               |
| <b>*information operations</b>                     | (Army) .....                                   | page 11-16                           |
| <b>*information superiority</b>                    | (Army) .....                                   | ¶11-1                                |
| <b>*information systems</b>                        | (Army) .....                                   | ¶11-31                               |
| <b>infrastructure</b>                              | .....  | JP 1-02                              |
| <b>initiative (individual)</b>                     | .....  | FM 6-22                              |
| <b>*initiative (operational)</b>                   | .....  | ¶4-51                                |
| <b>INS</b>   | Immigration and Naturalization Service         |                                      |
| <b>intelligence</b>                                | .....  | JP 1-02                              |
| <b>intelligence preparation of the battlefield</b> | .....  | FM 1-02                              |
| <b>interagency coordination</b>                    | .....  | JP 1-02                              |
| <b>interdiction</b>                                | .....  | JP 1-02                              |
| <b>*interior lines</b>                             | .....  | ¶5-35                                |
| <b>*intermediate staging base</b>                  | .....  | ¶3-56                                |
| <b>in-transit visibility</b>                       | (Army) .....                                   | FM 1-02                              |
| <b>IO</b>  | information operations                         |                                      |
| <b>IPB</b>   | intelligence preparation of the battlefield    |                                      |
| <b>IPTF</b>  | International Police Task Force (Bosnia)       |                                      |
| <b>IR</b>  | information requirements                       |                                      |
| <b>ISB</b>   | intermediate staging base                      |                                      |
| <b>ISR</b>   | intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance |                                      |
| <b>ISSA</b>  | interservice support agreement                 |                                      |
| <b>JFACC</b>                                       | joint force air component commander            |                                      |



|                                       |  |  |
|---------------------------------------|--|--|
| <b>JFC</b>                            | joint force commander  |  |
| <b>JFLCC</b>                          | joint force land component commander                         |  |
| <b>JOA</b>                            | joint operations area  |  |
| <b>joint force commander</b>          | .....  | JP 1-02  |
| <b>joint logistics over-the-shore</b> | .....  | JP 1-02, see joint logistics over-the-shore operations |
| <b>joint operation</b>                | .....  | JP 1-02  |
| <b>joint operations area</b>          | .....  | JP 1-02  |
| <b>joint rear area</b>                | .....  | JP 1-02  |
| <b>joint special operations area</b>  | .....  | JP 1-02  |
| <b>Joint Staff</b>                    | .....  | JP 1-02  |
| <b>joint task force</b>               | .....  | JP 1-02  |
| <b>JOPEs</b>                          | Joint Operation Planning and Execution System                |  |
| <b>JP</b>                             | joint publication  |  |
| <b>JTF</b>                            | joint task force   |  |
| <b>key terrain</b>                    | .....  | JP 1-02  |
| <b>lead agency</b>                    | .....  | JP 1-02  |
| <b>leadership</b>                     | .....  | FM 1-02  |
| <b>level III</b>                      | .....  | FM 1-02, see rear area threat levels                   |
| <b>limit of advance</b>               | .....  | FM 1-02  |
| <b>line of communications</b>         | .....  | JP 1-02  |
| <b>*lines of operations</b>           | .....  | ¶5-33  |
| <b>LOC</b>                            | line of communication  |  |
| <b>local security</b>                 | .....  | FM 1-02  |
| <b>LOGCAP</b>                         | Logistics Civil Augmentation Program                         |  |
| <b>LTG</b>                            | lieutenant general   |  |
| <b>M-16</b>                           | an Army assault rifle  |  |
| <b>M1A1</b>                           | the main battle tank used by Army forces during the Gulf War |  |
| <b>MACA</b>                           | military assistance to civil authorities                     |  |
| <b>MACOM</b>                          | major Army command   |  |
| <b>MACV</b>                           | Military Assistance Command–Vietnam                          |  |
| <b>*main effort</b>                   | .....  | ¶4-93  |
| <b>*major operation</b>               | .....  | ¶2-5   |
| <b>maneuver</b>                       | .....  | JP 1-02  |
| <b>marshaling area</b>                | .....  | JP 1-02  |

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|---|--|---------|
| <b>maritime power projection</b>          | .....  | JP 1-02 |
| <b>M/C/S</b>                              | mobility, countermobility, survivability   |         |
| <b>*meeting engagement</b>                | (Army) .....   | ¶7-51   |
| <b>METL</b>                               | mission essential task list  |         |
| <b>METT-TC</b>                            | mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations (the major factors considered during mission analysis) |         |
| <b>military department</b>                | .....  | JP 1-02 |
| <b>mission</b>                            | (Army) .....   | FM 1-02 |
| <b>MG</b>                                 | major general  |         |
| <b>MI</b>                                 | military intelligence  |         |
| <b>*mobile defense</b>                    | (Army) .....   | ¶8-16   |
| <b>mobility operations</b>                | .....  | FM 1-02 |
| <b>mobilization</b>                       | .....  | JP 1-02 |
| <b>MOOTW</b>                              | military operations other than war   |         |
| <b>movement control</b>                   | .....  | JP 1-02 |
| <b>*movement to contact</b>               | .....  | ¶7-46   |
| <b>MP</b>                                 | military police  |         |
| <b>MRX</b>                                | mission rehearsal exercise   |         |
| <b>MTW</b>                                | major theater war  |         |
| <b>National Command Authorities</b>       | .....  | JP 1-02 |
| <b>NATO</b>                               | North Atlantic Treaty Organization   |         |
| <b>NBC</b>                                | nuclear, biological, and chemical  |         |
| <b>NCA</b>                                | National Command Authorities   |         |
| <b>near real-time</b>                     | .....  | JP 1-02 |
| <b>NEO</b>                                | noncombatant evacuation operation  |         |
| <b>neutralize</b>                         | (Army) .....   | FM 1-02 |
| <b>NGO</b>                                | nongovernmental organization   |         |
| <b>NKPA</b>                               | North Korean People's Army   |         |
| <b>noncombatant evacuation operations</b> | .....  | JP 1-02 |
| <b>nongovernmental organization</b>       | .....  | JP 1-02 |
|   | (In FM 3-0, nongovernmental organizations include private voluntary organizations.)  |         |
| <b>NTC</b>                                | National Training Center   |         |
| <b>NVA</b>                                | North Vietnamese Army  |         |

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|   |                                    |                                      |
|---|------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| <b>obj</b>                                      | objective (graphic)                |                                      |
| <b>*offensive information operations (Army)</b> |                                    | page 11-17                           |
| <b>*offensive operations</b>                    |                                    | ¶1-48                                |
| <b>OPCON</b>                                    | operational control                |                                      |
| <b>operation</b>                                |                                    | JP 1-02                              |
| <b>*operational approach</b>                    |                                    | ¶5-42                                |
| <b>operational art</b>                          |                                    | JP 1-02                              |
| <b>operational control</b>                      |                                    | JP 1-02                              |
| <b>*operational fires</b>                       |                                    | ¶4-13                                |
| <b>*operational framework</b>                   |                                    | ¶4-69                                |
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| <b>*operational picture</b>                     |                                    | ¶11-43                               |
| <b>*operational reach</b>                       |                                    | ¶5-41                                |
| <b>operation plan</b>                           |                                    | JP 1-02                              |
| <b>operations security (Army)</b>               |                                    | FM 1-02                              |
| <b>OPSEC</b>                                    | operations security                |                                      |
| <b>order of battle</b>                          |                                    | JP 1-02                              |
| <b>overwatch</b>                                |                                    | FM 1-02                              |
| <b>PAO</b>                                      | public affairs officer             |                                      |
| <b>peace building</b>                           |                                    | JP 1-02                              |
| <b>peace enforcement operations</b>             |                                    | JP 1-02                              |
| <b>peacekeeping</b>                             |                                    | JP 1-02                              |
| <b>peacemaking</b>                              |                                    | JP 1-02                              |
| <b>peace operations</b>                         |                                    | JP 1-02                              |
| <b>*peacetime military engagement</b>           |                                    | ¶9-5                                 |
| <b>*penetration (Army)</b>                      |                                    | ¶7-37                                |
| <b>PEO</b>                                      | peace enforcement operations       |                                      |
| <b>permissive environment</b>                   |                                    | JP 1-02, see operational environment |
| <b>*phase</b>                                   |                                    | ¶6-13                                |
| <b>PIR</b>                                      | priority intelligence requirements |                                      |
| <b>PKO</b>                                      | peacekeeping operations            |                                      |
| <b>*planning</b>                                |                                    | ¶6-3                                 |
| <b>PME</b>                                      | peacetime military engagement      |                                      |

|   |  |         |
|---|--|---------|
| <b>PO</b>                                 | peace operations   |         |
| <b>POD</b>                                | port of debarkation  |         |
| <b>POLAD</b>                              | political advisor  |         |
| <b>power projection</b>                   | .....  | JP 1-02 |
| <b>*preparation</b>                       | .....  | ¶6-22   |
| <b>preventive diplomacy</b>               | .....  | JP 1-02 |
| <b>priority intelligence requirements</b> | .....  | JP 1-02 |
| <b>*protection</b>                        | .....  | ¶4-20   |
| <b>PSYOP</b>                              | psychological operations   |         |
| <b>public affairs</b>                     | .....  | JP 1-02 |
| <b>pursuit</b>                            | .....  | JP 1-02 |
| <b>R</b>                                  | reinforcing  |         |
| <b>raid</b>                               | .....  | JP 1-02 |
| <b>RC</b>                                 | reserve components (the Army National Guard and US Army Reserve) |         |
| <b>real-time</b>                          | .....  | JP1-02  |
| <b>*rear area</b>                         | (Army) .....   | ¶4-99   |
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| <b>reconstitution</b>                     | .....  | FM 1-02 |
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| <b>reorganization</b>                     | .....  | FM 1-02 |
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| <b>response force</b>                     | (Army) .....   | FM 1-02 |
| <b>retirement</b>                         | .....  | JP 1-02 |
| <b>*retrograde</b>                        | (Army) .....   | ¶8-22   |
| <b>*risk management</b>                   | (Army) .....   | ¶6-20   |
| <b>ROE</b>                                | rules of engagement  |         |
| <b>ROK</b>                                | Republic of Korea  |         |
| <b>RSO&amp;I</b>                          | reception, staging, onward movement, and integration             |         |
| <b>rules of engagement</b>                | .....  | JP 1-02 |
| <b>SANG</b>                               | Saudi Arabian National Guard                                     |         |
| <b>sea control operations</b>             | .....  | JP 1-02 |

|                                     |  |
|-------------------------------------|--|
| <b>*search and attack</b>           | ..... ¶7-50                                    |
| <b>security assistance</b>          | ..... JP 1-02                                  |
| <b>security operations</b>          | ..... FM 1-02                                  |
| <b>*sequel</b>                      | ..... ¶6-18                                    |
| <b>service component command</b>    | ..... JP 1-02                                  |
| <b>*shaping operations</b>          | ..... ¶4-86                                    |
| <b>show of force</b>                | ..... JP 1-02                                  |
| <b>*situational understanding</b>   | ..... ¶11-46                                   |
| <b>SJA</b>                          | staff judge advocate                           |
| <b>SMART</b>                        | special medical augmentation response teams    |
| <b>SOF</b>                          | special operations forces                      |
| <b>SOP</b>                          | standing operating procedure                   |
| <b>*spoiling attack</b>             | (Army)..... ¶7-60                              |
| <b>spt</b>                          | support (graphics)                             |
| <b>SSC</b>                          | smaller-scale contingency                      |
| <b>*stability operations</b>        | ..... ¶1-48                                    |
| <b>staging area</b>                 | ..... JP 1-02                                  |
| <b>standing operating procedure</b> | ..... JP 1-02                                  |
| <b>Stat.</b>                        | <i>Statutes at Large</i>                       |
| <b>*strategy</b>                    | (Army)..... ¶2-4                               |
| <b>strike</b>                       | ..... JP 1-02                                  |
| <b>*striking force</b>              | ..... page 8-5                                 |
| <b>strong point</b>                 | (Army)..... FM 1-02                            |
| <b>subunified command</b>           | ..... JP 1-02, see subordinate unified command |
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| <b>sustainment</b>                  | ..... JP 1-02                                  |
| <b>*synchronization</b>             | ..... ¶4-65                                    |
| <b>T-72</b>                         | a Russian/Soviet-built main battle tank        |

|                           |  |                                      |
|---------------------------|--|--------------------------------------|
| TACON                     | tactical control   |                                      |
| tactical assembly area    | .....  | JP 1-02                              |
| tactical combat force     | .....  | JP 1-02                              |
| tactical control          | .....  | JP 1-02                              |
| *tactical road march      | .....  | ¶7-45                                |
| *tactics                  | (Army) .....   | ¶2-12                                |
| *task organization        | .....  | ¶4-101                               |
| *task organizing          | .....  | ¶4-101                               |
| TCF                       | tactical combat force                                    |                                      |
| *tempo                    | .....  | ¶5-54                                |
| TEP                       | theater engagement planning/plan                         |                                      |
| terrain management        | .....  | FM 1-02                              |
| terrorism                 | .....  | JP 1-02                              |
| TF                        | task force   |                                      |
| theater                   | .....  | JP 1-02                              |
| theater of operations     | .....  | JP 1-02                              |
| theater of war            | .....  | JP 1-02                              |
| throughput                | .....  | JP 1-02                              |
| Title 10 responsibilities | responsibilities placed on the Army by Title 10, US Code |                                      |
| TPFDD                     | time-phased force and deployment data                    |                                      |
| TSC                       | theater support command                                  |                                      |
| turn                      | .....  | FM 1-02                              |
| *turning movement         | (Army) .....   | ¶7-35                                |
| UN                        | United Nations   |                                      |
| uncertain environment     | .....  | JP 1-02, see operational environment |
| unconventional warfare    | .....  | JP 1-02                              |
| unified action            | .....  | JP 1-02                              |
| unified command           | .....  | JP 1-02                              |
| *urban operations         | .....  | ¶6-76                                |
| URL                       | uniform resource locator                                 |                                      |
| US                        | United States  |                                      |
| USAMEDCOM                 | US Army Medical Command                                  |                                      |
| USC                       | United States Code                                       |                                      |
| USCENTCOM                 | US Central Command                                       |                                      |

|                                    |                             |         |
|------------------------------------|-----------------------------|---------|
| <b>USEUCOM</b>                     | US European Command         |         |
| <b>USJFCOM</b>                     | US Joint Forces Command     |         |
| <b>*versatility</b>                | .....                       | ¶4-67   |
| <b>warning order</b>               | .....                       | JP 1-02 |
| <b>weapons of mass destruction</b> | .....                       | JP 1-02 |
| <b>withdrawal</b>                  | .....                       | JP 1-02 |
| <b>WMD</b>                         | weapons of mass destruction |         |

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